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THE INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT OF
MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW:
A COMMENT ON PRIEST'S VIEW OF
THE CATHEDRAL'S FOUNDATIONS
DAVID G. OWEN*
FEW scholars in recent years have seriously studied the intellectual
history of modern products liability theory. Although the economics of
the area has caught the fancy of many recent scholars, only a few writers
have critically reviewed the original (and still conventional) rationales for
strict manufacturer accountability for product accidents.1 Perhaps this
lack of scholarly interest is attributable to the compelling force of the
academic scholarship-spearheaded by James, Prosser, and others in the
1950s and early 1960s and elaborated in the late 1960s and 1970s by Wade,
Keeton and others-which set firmly in place the now conventional
rationales.2 Probably the lack of interest was reinforced by the rapid and
overwhelming judicial acceptance of the doctrine and its standard ra-
tionales-led by Judge Francis in Henningsen in 1960 and Judge Traynor
* Visiting Professor of Law, University of Michigan; Professor of Law, University of
South Carolina.
' See, for example, Alan Schwartz, Products Liability and Judicial Wealth Redistribu-
tions, 51 Ind. L. J. 558 (1976); Howard C. Klemme, The Enterprise Liability Theory of
Torts, 47 Colo. L. Rev. 153 (1976); Richard A. Epstein, Modem Products Liability Law
(1980); David G. Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 Vand. L.
Rev. 681 (1980).
2 The conventional rationales include: (1) representations of product quality by manufac-
turers inducing consumer expectations of product safety; (2) the powerlessness of consum-
ers with respect to safety resulting from the complexity and diversity of products; (3) the
power of manufacturers over product danger information and design; (4) probability of
manufacturer negligence in producing defective products, yet difficulty for consumers to
prove fault; (5) deterrence of product accidents (encouraging product safety); (6) risk
spreading; and (7) forcing enterprises to internalize the costs of product accidents. See John
E. Montgomery & David G. Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Administration of Strict
Tort Liability for Defective Products, 27 S.C. L. Rev. 803, 809-10 (1976).
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in Greenman3 in 1963, certified by § 402A of the Second Restatement of
Torts in 1964, and spread by other judges across the land in the late 1960s
and 1970s. This impressive convergence of academic and judicial thought
appeared to demonstrate an ineluctable historical imperative, based on a
variety of the familiar rationales, toward "enterprise liability" for product
accidents. George Priest's masterful inquiry into the contributions of
James and Kessler to the formation of certain of these rationales-risk
spreading, manufacturer power, and cost internalization-adds a valu-
able dimension to the growing critique of modern products liability theory
and doctrine.
Priest's paper is largely a retelling of the development of strict products
liability in tort. Its principal value lies in its focus on the early contribu-
tions of James and Kessler. His review of James's arguments for risk
distribution (and to a lesser extent cost internalization), and of Kessler's
arguments for legal control of corporate power, gives important insights
into the confluence of tort and contract theory that generated the modern
concepts of enterprise liability.
While Priest's insights indeed advance our historical understanding of
certain important theoretical underpinnings of modern products liability
law and theory, their explanatory value is narrower than his paper sug-
gests. "Intellectual histories" that focus on the contributions of a small
number of legal scholars run the risk of telling us principally about the
thinking of the chosen scholars, rather than providing a balanced study of
the scholarship in the field.4 To be most useful, intellectual histories
should define with caution the contribution of each such scholar, should
recognize (even if only generally) the related contributions of other legal
scholars, and should place all the work in its broader sociopolitical con-
text.
Much less than in science are theories suddenly "invented" in the law.5
Instead, most legal concepts evolve slowly from various strands of ideas.
It is in fact the very nature of good scholarship that it derives from earlier
' As Priest points out, one must look to the concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co. of Fresno, 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944), for Judge Traynor's
principal articulation of the strict liability rationales. I have some trouble, however, with
Priest's assertion that Traynor's concurring opinion was largely ignored in the scholarship of
the early 1950s. See the masterful piece by Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Negligence without Fault
(1951), reprinted in 54 Cal. L. Rev. 1422, 1473 (1966); see also William L. Prosser, Hand-
book of the Law of Torts 506 n.I (2d ed. 1955).
4 The best example of this approach of which I am aware is G. Edward White, Tort Law
in America: An Intellectual History (1980).
' See, for example, George P. Fletcher, Two Modes of Legal Thought, 90 Yale L. J. 970,
1001 (1981).
COMMENT ON PRIEST
generations of writing and is enriched by strong cross-fertilization from
other contemporary scholarship. With or without the help of Kessler,
therefore, James did not "invent" the notion of enterprise liability or any
of its underlying precepts, as Priest's paper might suggest. Instead, both
scholars worked from and contributed to a rich intellectual mosaic. As
Priest acknowledges, James did not invent the theories of risk distribution
or cost internalization. Kessler and particularly James no doubt helped to
shape and perhaps accelerate the evolving notion of applying enterprise
liability concepts to the manufacture of defective products. My guess is,
however, that Henningsen, Greenman, and § 402A would have come to
pass in any event, had James and Kessler never written a word-that
their work was not in fact a sine qua non of the development of modem
products liability law. In my judgment a solid social consensus, much
bigger than two men, forged the triumph of modern products liability
theory and doctrine.
Other legal scholars, other legal concepts, and other sociopolitical de-
velopments worked together to form and combine the various strands of
theory underlying modem products liability law. By way of example, both
Llewellyn (on the contracts side) and Prosser (on the torts side) deserve
more credit than Priest affords them. Priest does not ignore their work,
but often he understates its significance. He gives passing recognition to
Llewellyn, but he does not give sufficient credit to Llewellyn's substantial
early contributions on the warranty of quality.6 He gives some begrudging
recognition to Prosser, but does not give due credit to Prosser's early
articulation of the modem rationales. 7 It may be true that James's scholar-
ship in the products liability field during the 1950s has received somewhat
less attention over the years than it deserved. But in elevating so much
the contributions of James and Kessler, Priest misleadingly diminishes
those of Llewellyn, Prosser, and others.
The focus on two men leaves crucial gaps in the intellectual genealogy
of products liability law. In using Kessler as the sole representative for
the contract root of strict products liability, Priest's analysis leaves bare a
fundamentally important intellectual branch of this area of the law: the
warranty law concept that vendor misrepresentations may harm consum-
ers by unfairly distorting their expectations of product quality. The notion
that sellers should not be permitted so to trick consumers into paying "fair
6 See K. N. Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality and Society (pts. 1, 2), 36 Colum. L. Rev.
699 (1936); 37 Colum. L. Rev. 341 (1937). See generally William Twining, Karl Llewellyn
and the Realist Movement (1973).
7 See William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (Ist ed. 1941), ch. 15, esp. at 689;
id. (2d ed. 1955), ch. 17, esp. at 506-7.
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value" for goods that are other (more dangerous) than they are said or
appear to be is the oldest and perhaps strongest root of modern products
liability law. Its origins date at least from the ancient law of Rome; its
influence continues through a strong ecclesiastical and secular tradition of
medieval Europe, and takes firm root from an early date in the common
law of England and the United States as a vital interest protected by the
law both of tort and contract. 8 As chronicled in the 1960s by Prosser and
others, the crumbling of the citadel of privity and the weakening of other
contractual limitations on liability and damages (such as disclaimers, limi-
tations on remedies, and the notice of breach requirement) had to occur
before tort law could reabsorb the function of protecting consumers
against the frustration of their expectations by seller misrepresentations
of product quality. The strongly ethical flavor to this theory does not fit
neatly into Priest's account of the rise of enterprise liability. But its in-
fluence on the developing law was powerful, 9 even if this is not evident
from the writings of James and Kessler.
In addition, Priest might have been more catholic in his historical re-
construction of the products liability law cathedral. His discussion of the
impact of Nazi totalitarianism on Kessler sheds valuable light on Kes-
sler's belief in the oppressiveness of manufacturer power. The history
would also have benefited from at least a brief inquiry into the role of
other contemporaneous trends in social and political thought, from the
beliefs behind Roosevelt's New Deal liberalism to the evolving concep-
tions of social welfare, citizen entitlements, and corporate power and its
abuse. It was probably more than mere coincidence that the electorate
chose to cast its fate in 1960 with the liberal spirit of John F. Kennedy less
than five months after the judiciary had decided to cast its fate with the
liberal spirit of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors.
Intellectual currents were thus abroad, much wider than those ex-
pressed in the legal writings of James and Kessler, which must have
8 See generally W. Page Keeton, David G. Owen, & John E. Montgomery, Products
Liability and Safety-Cases and Materials 19-26 (1980).
9 The consumer expectations thesis was explicated at an early date by Reed Dickerson in
Products Liability and the Food Consumer 3-5 (1951), and more fully developed in Reed
Dickerson, Products Liability: How Good Does a Product Have to Be? 42 Ind. L. Rev. 301
(1967). For more recent discussions, see Michael D. Bernacchi, A Behavioral Model for
Imposing Strict Liability in Tort: The Importance of Analyzing Product Performance in
Relation to Consumer Expectation and Frustration, 47 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 43 (1978); and the
amusing effort by F. Patrick Hubbard, Reasonable Human Expectations: A Normative
Model for Imposing Strict Liability for Defective Products, 29 Mercer L. Rev. 465 (1978).
Shapo has exhaustively developed the representational thesis more recently. See Marshall
S. Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine, Function and
Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 Va. L. Rev. 1109 (1974).
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provided these and other legal scholars with important germs of thought
to be distilled and formulated into legal concepts. The fit was surely very
comfortable between the dominant political sentiments of the 1960s and
the belief of James and others that the economic burden of accidental
injuries should be taken from individual "victims" and placed on institu-
tions which could then "absorb" or pass them on through price increase
"taxes" to the general society. If these concepts today seem in some ways
naive and roughly constructed intellectually, they should in fairness be
placed back to that time of enthusiastic optimism, dominated by assump-
tions validated by nearly two decades of experience: that the economic
pie was growing much faster than the population; that society would be
able to satisfy the economic wants of nearly all within another couple of
decades (by 1985?); and that enterprise liability was but a brief rest stop
on the short journey to a broad-based system of social health and welfare
insurance.' 0 Certainly as predictions these perspectives have proved quite
false. Yet as postulates they most likely influenced the early scholarship
on enterprise liability, and they most certainly enhanced the largely un-
critical acceptance of strict manufacturer liability by both the courts and
commentators in the 1960s.
Priest's penetrating account of the intellectual origins of the modern
products liability law cathedral opens to the light at least two key con-
cepts in its foundation: manufacturer insurance and manufacturer power.
One should hope that the intellectual history of other aspects of modern
products liability theory, particularly its roots in misrepresentation and
consumer expectations, will be examined as carefully in the future by
Priest or others. Once we understand more fully from where the conven-
tional concepts came and what they really said we can begin to critique
them more constructively, to extract what strands of intellectual value
they may contain, and to discard the rest. Then will come the major task:
to identify the social values that products liability law should protect and
promote, and finally to construct a new cathedral of principles and rules
on those firm foundations. Priest's valuable historical perspective on cer-
tain intellectual origins underlying modern products liability law advances
in significant measure the journey to that end.
" "Until Americans have a comprehensive scheme of social insurance, courts must re-
solve by a balancing process the head-on collision between the need for adequate recovery
and viable enterprises .... This balancing task should be approached with a realization that
the basic consideration involves a determination of the most just allocation of the risk of loss
between the members of the marketing chain." Helene Curtis Industries, Inc. v. Pruitt, 385
F.2d 841, 862 (5th Cir. 1967) (citing Richard G. Wilson, Products Liability (pt. 2), The
Protection of the Producing Enterprise, 43 Calif. L. Rev. 809 (1955)).

